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Abstract In the search for the primary roots of autonomy (a
pivotal concept in Varela’s comprehensive understanding of
living beings), the theory of autopoiesis provided an explicit
criterion to deﬁne minimal life in universal terms, and was
taken as a guideline in the research program for the artiﬁcial
synthesis of biological systems. Acknowledging the
invaluable contribution of the autopoietic school to present
biological thinking, we offer an alternative way of conceiving
the most basic forms of autonomy. We give a bottom-up
account of the origins of “self-production” (or
self-construction, as we propose to call it), pointing out
which are the minimal material and energetic requirements
for the constitution of basic autonomous systems. This
account is, indeed, committed to the project of developing a
general theory of biology, but well grounded in the universal
laws of physics and chemistry. We consider that the
autopoietic theory was formulated in highly abstract terms
and, in order to advance in the implementation of minimal
autonomous systems (and, at the same time, make major
progress in exploring the origins of life), a more speciﬁc
characterization of minimal autonomous systems is required.
Such a characterization will not be drawn from a review of
the autopoietic criteria and terminology (` a la Fleischaker) but
demands a whole reformulation of the question: a proper
naturalization of the concept of autonomy. Finally, we also
discuss why basic autonomy, according to our account, is
necessary but not sufﬁcient for life, in contrast with Varela’s
idea that autopoiesis was a necessary and sufﬁcient condition
for it.
1 Introduction: General and Historical
Background of the Problem
Three decades ago, Maturana and Varela proposed the idea that life, in its most funda-
mental core, is a certain form of organization, characterized by a recursive production
dynamics. They invented the term autopoiesis (from Greek: autos “self” and poiein
“creation”) precisely to express the idea that the essence of the phenomenon of life is
the individual organization by which each living entity recursively produces itself [38,
39, 78]. More speciﬁcally, according to the theory of autopoiesis, what deﬁnes life is
a global network of relations establishing a self-maintaining dynamics in which action
and constitution are one and the same thing for the system: that is, the activity of the
system consists in the continuous (re)generation of all the processes and components
that put it together as an operational unit.
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Although the merit of developing this idea is to be given to Maturana and Varela, in
one of Varela’s last papers [80] he acknowledges his intellectual debt to Kant, who in
the Critique of Judgment (§65, 66) conceives organisms as systems in which parts are
formed for and from the others, constituting a whole dynamic unit outside which their
very existence is meaningless. And he also acknowledges the importance and deepness
of thought in this respect of Hans Jonas, a philosopher who—several years before the
autopoietic theory was born—stated that the essence of life is expressed in the idea
of metabolism, namely, in the continuous constitution of an identity through recursive
internal processes and interactions with the environment [23]. Although the work of
these authors did not have a direct inﬂuence on the elaboration of the autopoietic
theory, the notion that living systems are guided by an internal principle, which arises
from the recursive processes that constitute themselves, already appears there (as Varela
himself points out).
Outside the philosophical domain, during the sixties and seventies, certain leading
researchers in the ﬁeld of theoretical biology also put forward similar ideas, claiming
that the most basic feature of living systems is a network property by which a set
of component production processes recurrently generates its own starting conditions.
This central concept, with different shades and degrees of elaboration, is present in
Rashevsky’s relational biology [61], in Rosen’s metabolic and repair (M, R) systems [63],
and in Pattee’s notion of statistical closure [55], for instance. Thus, instead of regarding
life as a phenomenon that stems from the particular properties of various types of
macromolecules and supramolecular structures (DNA, RNA, proteins, lipid aggregates,
etc.), some authors already share the view that life is, rather, a system property. And so
do the founders of the autopoietic theory.
Probably, the main contribution of Maturana and Varela was to articulate a full-
ﬂedged and coherent formulation of all these boiling thoughts and ideas. From their
conception of autopoiesis as the nuclear principle underlying the phenomenon of life
(and, to a good extent, also of cognition [39]), they created a new, clear, and far-
reaching interdisciplinary and philosophical view. As Varela himself explains in his
book The phenomenon of life [77, pp. 429–438], the idea of autopoiesis took shape
from the concepts of self-referentiality and closure developed in the second cybernetics
(especially by von F¨ orster) during the sixties. So it was from that abstract and, to some
extent, top-down theoretical perspective that Maturana and Varela, at the beginning of
the seventies, started to construct the idea of autopoiesis, grounding it in the notion
of organizational closure,1 and foreseeing it as the deﬁnitional principle of a minimal
living system.
Together with the notion of organizational closure, two other important concepts
were crucial to mature the idea of autopoiesis: the concept of component production
network (abstraction of the idea of metabolism) and that of individuality, or spatial-
topological unity (the physical border, possibly as an abstraction of the idea of cell
membrane). Their central claim is, then, that the closure or recursivity in the organiza-
tion is generated by the way in which the components and production processes of the
system get intertwined in the context of a complementary relationship between the net-
work and the physical border (which are, at the same time, condition for and result of
each other). Thus, the internal relations of production collectively acquire a coherent,
operational meaning, since they contribute to the global maintenance of the system.2
And the relations of the system with its environment, being necessary extensions of
this primary internal organization, are conceived as actions that the system performs
on its own behalf. So, starting from autopoiesis, Maturana and Varela build a theory
1 The term “operational”—instead of “organizational”—closure was adopted later.
2 Although the autopoietic authors avoid any reference to the idea of “function” or “functionality” in this context (for reasons that
we will not go into), in this article the terms “operational,” “organizational,” and “functional” are used interchangeably.
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that aims to cover both the internal aspect of the basic organization of living systems
(metabolism) and the external aspect (agency), showing that they are two sides of the
same coin. In other words, the idea of autopoiesis should already hold, according to
its authors, all that is necessary for life and meaning.
Therefore, the concept of autopoiesis crystallizes from a very generic received idea
of closure and recursivity, rather than from a theoretical scheme concerned with the
natural processes of self-organization leading from the inert physico-chemical world to
more robust and complex forms of (adaptive) self-maintenance. Actually, from Matu-
rana and Varela’s point of view, the formation of an autopoietic system is essentially
a relational-constructive issue, a formal (or computational) problem whose solution
should determine the set of abstract primitives (components) and rules of its interac-
tions that achieve an operational closure [78]. Accordingly, their approach makes no
consideration whatsoever of thermodynamic requirements or other energetic-material
constraints, because (as they explicitly acknowledge [39, p. 89]) it does not affect
the organization—the self-productive logic—of the system. In this way, claiming that
life is founded on a purely relational property, the authors of the autopoietic theory
contributed, among others, to opening up the road for ALife and the challenge to
universalize biology.
However, the level of abstraction of the theory of autopoiesis (not only present in its
original formulation, but maintained in most later contributions and ideas developed
from it, such as Varela’s conception of autonomy [75, 76]) is too high for an adequate
naturalization of the problem, as Fleischaker already pointed out [20, 21]. Although
Varela was interested in the chemical realizations of autopoietic systems [35], he was not
really concerned about the way in which the basic organization of living beings could
be inﬂuenced or conditioned by the laws of physics and chemistry (probably because
he believed, all through his career, that it was not in any relevant way). Neither did
he get much involved in the problem of the origins of life, because the discussions on
whether proteins or nucleic acids had to come ﬁrst (and similar ones) were too far from
the point he was trying to make (namely, that life is a systemic property, characterized
by the autopoietic way of organization, regardless of the components that come to
realize it).
Here we are going to deal with the same problem that the autopoietic theory was
posing (determining the nature of the minimal self-productive organization), with a
similar insight (in the sense that systems with this type of organization are a prerequisite
for a biological evolutionary process to begin [77; see also 64]) but a quite different
approach, since our aim is to show the physico-chemical roots of the problem and their
important general implications (i.e., the material-energetic requirements involved in the
implementation of any system with that characteristic organization). In order to do so, it
is not enough to make some amendment to the autopoietic criteria and terminology (as
Fleischaker did [20, 21]), but the whole issue of the nature and origins of autonomous,
self-constructing systems has to be reconsidered from scratch, retackled from a different
standpoint [67, 68]. This new way to look into the problem will hopefully contribute
to develop a more realistic and precise characterization of minimal metabolic systems,
which can be used to focus with a different lens the research on the origins of life, or
guide attempts to synthesize artiﬁcially the most basic autonomous systems.
Despite our deep criticism of the autopoietic theory (also regarding a possible com-
plete deﬁnition of the phenomenon of life—see the last sections of this article), we
think that the main message of Varela is still valid, and the attempt is to give it new
life through a different interpretation of the issues involved. This message could help
to articulate a shift of focus in the ﬁeld of origins of life (certainly needed) and the
ALife research projects that try to contribute to it. The shift would imply giving up our
ﬁxation on the speciﬁc molecular components of present living beings on Earth, with
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the aim of thinking more in terms of the characteristic way in which they integrate an
operational unit, a dynamic self-productive organization. Hence the importance of the
autopoietic theory, and its fundamental claim that life is a property of a whole system,
rather than a property of individual molecules (or populations of these molecules).
Nevertheless, this systemthinking does not imply forgetting about the material mech-
anisms that are crucial to trigger off a biological type of phenomenon/behavior; rather,
it means putting the emphasis on the interactive processes that make it up, that is,
on the dynamic organization in which biomolecules (or, rather, their precursors) actu-
ally get integrated. According to this view, research should be directed to implement
those—or very similar—interactive processes with molecular components and tools that
are alternative to (and, perhaps, less complex than) the biochemical machinery present
in known living beings. And always with the aim of showing a natural connection with
other complex physico-chemical forms of organization.
The concept of autonomy is probably crucial to understanding how life could appear
on the Earth, as well as for the project of developing a general theory of biology,
such as Varela envisioned. However, this tentatively universal concept should also
contribute to bridging the gap between the living and the inert worlds, and thus the
level of abstraction in its formulation should not preclude its naturalization. That is why
the account we offer in the following pages is very much concerned with the material-
energetic-thermodynamic aspects of the problem of establishing a minimal autonomous
organization.
2 The Origins of Autonomous Systems: Introducing the Idea of Basic
Autonomy
The problem of the origin of autonomous systems is a difﬁcult one, for two important
reasons. First, the most elementary examples of self-constructing systems that we know
of today (e.g., some primitive bacteria) constitute too complex forms of organization,
that is, are too distant from self-organizing systems that may come about spontaneously
in far-from-equilibrium conditions, such as those appearing in nonlinear convection or
reaction-diffusion phenomena (typical examples of the so-called dissipative structures
[52]). Second, we do not have a clear or universally accepted criterion to characterize
other possible—more primitive and rudimentary—forms of autonomy (although the
present article is an attempt to advance in that direction). In spite of that, and even
though it is impossible to know a priori what those systems could be like, it seems quite
natural—from a bottom-up approach—to look for their origins in the context of physico-
chemical dissipative systems with potential to go through processes of progressive
growth in complexity.
Now, although the phenomenon of self-organization always involves the generation
and maintenance of a global (or high-level) pattern or correlation that constrains the
(low-level) dynamics of the components of the system (see [52] or [10]), in standard
dissipative structures this occurs only provided that the system is put under the appro-
priate boundary conditions. If those (externally controlled) conditions are changed (in
particular, if the input of matter or energy is outside a certain range), the self-organizing
dynamics vanishes. Therefore, there is an important difference between the typical ex-
amples of “spontaneous” dissipative structures and real autonomous systems: in the for-
mer case, the ﬂow of energy and/or matter that keeps the system away from equilibrium
is not controlled by the organization of the system (the key boundary conditions are
externally established, either by the scientist in the lab or by some natural phenomenon
that is not causally dependent on the self-organizing one), whereas in the latter case,
the constraints that actually guide energy/matter ﬂows from the environment through
the constitutive processes of the system are endogenously created and maintained.
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If one considers the type of self-organizing systems that could evolve in the direc-
tion just indicated (i.e., towards a truly self-building organization), it soon becomes
manifest—see below—that their internal dynamics should be capable of generating
constraints (control mechanisms) that are not only global, like the macroscopic spatio-
temporal patterns of typical dissipative structures, but also local and molecularly selec-
tive. This means that purely physical self-organizing phenomena have to be disregarded
in favor of chemical ones, since only the latter would be able to turn into component
production systems. And only in that context can a diverse enough set of control
mechanisms and boundary conditions be internally generated and regulated, for it is
possible that certain components of the system act as local and speciﬁc constraints on
the production processes of some others.
Accordingly, the problem of the origins of autonomy must be tackled in a sce-
nario where chemical reaction networks (component production systems) in far-from-
equilibrium, dissipative conditions may thrive and achieve some robust self-maintaining
dynamics. However, as Bickhard [6] points out, self-maintenance—the way it is usually
understood—is not enough. In order to illustrate the point, he discusses an example
of a dissipative system “in between” physics and chemistry: a candle. In his view, the
burning of a candle is a “self-maintaining” phenomenon, for the ﬂame itself contributes
to keeping the system away from equilibrium, in the conditions that make it continu-
ously realizable (in particular, a high temperature and a constant oxygen uptake). Even
the shape it takes is very stable in the face of disturbances (of course, provided they are
not too strong). Nevertheless, this system shows great limitations compared to what
the author calls “recursive self-maintaining systems.” The latter would be capable of
modifying their own self-maintenance processes in order to adjust to environmental
changes that seriously threaten their continuity. This would be the case of a bacteria
swimming up a glucose gradient, or a (ﬁctitious) candle capable of fetching wax from
its surroundings when it begins to run out of it.
What Bickhard here brings to the fore is a very important point, usually disre-
garded in models and experiments that try to go beyond phenomena of chemical
“self-organization” or “self-maintenance”: the fact that this kind of system must develop
its own mechanisms to stay away from thermodynamic equilibrium and, in particular,
has to channel and modulate the interaction with the environment so as to keep its
characteristic dynamics (the network of chemical transformations) running. The general
tendency to overlook these aspects of the problem comes partly from the widespread
idea that autocatalysis (or perhaps some other basic chemical mechanism) can bring
about all that is required to constitute this kind of component production network.
However, despite all the experimental and theoretical work carried out in this direction
(following, among others, the pioneer model of autocatalytic sets [18, 25, 26]), there
is little real evidence that this may actually be so. Rather, it seems that autocatalysis
is a very important mechanism underlying many different types of complex chemical
phenomena (from Belousov-Zhabotinskii oscillatory reactions to metabolic pathways
in living organisms), but not the crucial one that marks out the transition from self-
organization to self-producing or self-constructing systems, ensuring the viability of
robust self-maintaining chemical networks.3
3 Several experiments prove that certain biopolymers (e.g., oligonucleotides [28] or oligopeptides [31]) are, by themselves, also
capable of autocatalytic behavior (even claimed to be the most elementary examples of molecular self-replication). Nevertheless,
neither the diversity of chemical species nor the complexity of the catalytic loops present in those experiments can support
the idea of an autocatalytic component production network in that context. Thus, we can ﬁnd real examples of autocatalytic
phenomena in systems with very simple components and very low organizational complexity (chemical oscillations), in systems
with very complex components and organization (natural metabolisms), or in systems with fairly complex components (such as
peptide or nucleotide chains) but poor organization (the just-mentioned experiments). However, we miss intermediate examples
that, with diverse but relatively simple molecular compounds, show a higher organizational complexity than the traditional chemical
dissipative structures. And that is the heart of the question.
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The problem is more intricate: As we already mentioned and will show better below,
it involves the articulation of various types of control mechanisms, both local and global.
And it requires elaborating an account of minimal autonomous systems that is naturally
embedded in—and consistent with—the general framework of thermodynamics. This
leads to the conception of basic autonomy [67, 68] as the capacity of a system to
manage the ﬂow of matter and energy through it so that it can, at the same time,
regulate, modify, and control: (i) internal self-constructive processes and (ii) processes
of exchange with the environment. Thus, the system must be able to generate and
regenerate all the constraints—including part of its boundary conditions—that deﬁne it
as such, together with its own particular way of interacting with the environment. In
other words, the constructive processes that actually put the system together have to be
directly involved in the continuous exchange of material-energetic resources with the
environment, and, conversely, the achievement of these resources is indispensable for
the appearance and maintenance of those processes. Such an interdependence—on
which we further elaborate next—between the constructive and interactive aspects of
the phenomenon is precisely the cornerstone for the constitution of any real metabolic
organization.4
2.1 Thermodynamic Issues Are Relevant for Basic Autonomy
Thermodynamics matters. However limited it may be in providing a detailed, complete,
satisfactory explanation of the appearance of autonomous systems, its far-reaching im-
plications cannot be disregarded. For instance, of all the processes that could—in
principle—take place in the context of component production networks, only some
will happen to be thermodynamically (let alone kinetically) feasible. This point is cru-
cial because some processes (such as the generation of most polymer chains, or the
transport of a substance against its gradient), are not spontaneous (i.e., they are “up-
hill,” or endergonic, processes), yet are very important for achieving self-construction.
And they can only take place if coupled to some other spontaneous (“downhill,” or ex-
ergonic) ones. Therefore, a whole set of endergonic-exergonic couplings is required,
both to take advantage of a far-from-equilibrium thermodynamic situation in a con-
structive way, and to actually persist in that situation. This set of coupling mechanisms
(both internal and with the environment, which is always the ﬁnal source and sink of
matter and energy) would put together some sort of cyclic proto-metabolic organization
[46, 47]. Now, such coupling mechanisms (or, alternatively, the set of constraints that
put them together) have to be built up by the system itself (otherwise, we could not
be speaking about autonomy in minimally rigorous terms), and energy resources are
required for the task.
This problem leads us to search for a fundamental connection between constraints
and useful energy (or work)—a connection that, as a founding principle for basic au-
tonomy, would constitute an important step in integrating the two different approaches
to the analysis of minimal biological organization (the relational-constructive approach
and the energetic-thermodynamic one [69]). Work can be regarded as a constrained
release of energy [1, 27], as opposed to heat, which is energy that escapes all control.
Work is usually deﬁned in engineering terms as a form of energy that is “useful,” for
it allows the performance of some type of function (typically an external function).
However, the concept of work may be applied more generally, both to heteronomous
systems (like classical machines) and to autonomous systems (like living beings), even
if the conditions differ quite a lot from one to the other. In the latter case, work can-
not be deﬁned from the perspective of an external (intelligent) agent; rather, it should
4 This is the reason why we prefer to use the term “self-construction” instead of “self-production,” highlighting the idea that (basic)
autonomy cannot be just the result of an internal set of processes that achieve some closure (operational [75], catalytic [27], etc.),
but always involves a material and energetic “effort,” linked to the establishment of a new way of interacting with the environment.
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be conceived as any energetic contribution to the construction and maintenance of a
certain cohesive, self-organizing system away from thermodynamic equilibrium. Func-
tional actions in this context are those that ensure the self-maintenance and autonomy
of the organization.5 Hence the intrinsic functional character of the processes that are
carried out by (and at the same time constitute) autonomous systems.
Thus, autonomous organization is only possible if it generates constraints that mod-
ulate the ﬂows of energy so that those constraints are regenerated and contribute in this
way to the recursive maintenance of the organization. In the simple heteronomous case
of a thermal machine, the walls of the cylinder, the piston, and so on, are the constraints
required to extract work from the expansion of a gas. In an autonomous system, things
occur quite differently: constraints (as part of the ongoing self-constructing dynamics)
are continuously being generated and regenerated, coming together to establish cou-
plings of endergonic and exergonic processes, which constitute the fundamental way
to produce work in the system.6 So work involves constraints, but, as we said before,
the generation of constraints in turn involves having some energy ready for use (i.e.,
energy in the form of work) in the ﬁrst place.
On similar lines, Kauffman [27] claims that in an autonomous system “work begets
constraints begets work.” In other words, he points out that a recursive relationship
between work and constraints must be established if a system is to achieve autonomy;
namely, “the work-constraint (W-C) cycle.” The W-C cycle triggers a new dynamics
in a system, a constructive and recursive (though never fully closed) dynamics, as a
result of which a web of constraints is progressively generated, hand in hand with a
continuous process of propagation of work.
Without contradicting the laws of thermodynamics, this establishes a new energetic
“logic” in the system. The cycle is open, and it certainly involves irreversibility and
dissipation, but as it drives the system further and further away from equilibrium, it
also sets up a way to counterbalance and keep under control the typically increasing
dissipative effects of that situation through the establishment of a more and more com-
plex web of endergonic-exergonic couplings. In sum, the W-C cycle expresses the
deep interrelation between self-construction and autonomy, for it shows how and why
the latter, in its minimal form, is only possible through component production systems
that are at the same time operationally closed and thermodynamically open.
3 Basic Autonomy as Self-Construction: Fundamental Problems
The conception of basic autonomy as the self-constructing capacity of a system (stem-
ming from the recursive consecution of the W-C cycle and through the establishment of
a set of endergonic-exergonic coupling mechanisms) provides a theoretical framework
that will allow us to articulate a more precise and explicit account of the origins of
natural autonomous systems and, hopefully, also contribute to design the synthesis of
artiﬁcial ones. The Varelian top-down and rather abstract conception did not make it
easy to collect all the ingredients involved, whereas Kauffman’s recent approach to the
problem, though sharp and enlightening, does not go far enough in the direction re-
quired. One has to step forward and get wet, specifying what kind of constraints—and
associated types of work—are needed to effectively achieve minimal self-constructing
systems. Such will be the objective of the next pages: determining which are the nec-
5 Herein we shall use the term “functional” in its most elementary sense, as the quality of an action through which the components
of a network can alter the probability of other components’ production [11]. This means, considering the network as a whole, that
all those processes that contribute to the self-maintenance of the global system are to be regarded as functional [45, 7]. Hence, a
function cannot be explained except by an argument that resorts to the coherence or persistence of the system as a whole.
6 Kauffman draws an interesting parallel between an endergonic-exergonic coupling and a “cycle of work,” understood in the
traditional terms of Carnot thermal engines [27].
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essary and sufﬁcient conditions (components, control mechanisms, etc.) to establish
the minimal set of endergonic-exergonic couplings that brings about basic autonomy.
In order to do so, we will brieﬂy analyze a series of interconnected problems to be
faced by any component production system aiming to become an autonomous chemical
entity (for a more detailed account see [66]).
3.1 The Problems of Space-Time Coordination and Efﬁcient Energy Transfer
between Constitutive Processes
If the couplings between endo and exergonic processes were to happen just in pairs,
in an isolated way, they would not lead anywhere. A properly sequenced and inter-
connected set of couplings is required in order to get a coherent operational dynamics.
In this regard, it is crucial that the system generates some local constraining mecha-
nisms with which the reaction speeds of many different processes can be modiﬁed and
properly regulated.
In general, if a process, a chain of reactions, or a coupling is favorable from a ther-
modynamic point of view (i.e., if it is globally exergonic), that means that it is actually
possible. However, that does not say anything about when or how it will take place.
For example, the degradation of glucose is, in principle, spontaneous at physiological
temperature (G◦ =− 686 kcal/mol), but it would take years in any living being if
it were not for the presence of enzymes that act as catalysts of the process and help
energy be quickly released from it (triggering other metabolic processes). Anyway, that
is only part of the story. The capacity of enzymes to change activation energies per se
would lead the system to crazy autocatalytic behavior if it were not for the sophisticated
regulation mechanisms that control their action. These mechanisms (based on several
kinds of inhibitors—competitive, allosteric, etc.—for a very good review on metabolic
control see [19]) guarantee the homeostasis of the whole system (its global metabolic
consistency and even its speciﬁc responses to certain external disturbances).
The problem is that enzymes (or other biomolecules with catalytic activity, like RNA)
are too complex to be present at the ﬁrst stages of the origin of living beings. But the job
could possibly be done at the beginning by a few types of more rudimentary catalysts
(perhaps oligopeptides or smaller multimers, as de Duve [16] suggests), whose forma-
tion would be favored in the context of lipidic or fatty acid self-assembled structures,
such as primitive vesicles. These catalysts, instead of being substrate-speciﬁc, would
carry out more generic tasks (possibly grouped into several reaction types: reduction-
oxidation, polymerization, transport, etc.), and take part in reaction pathways that
would have little resemblance to those present in the simplest living beings today (i.e.,
to genetically instructed metabolic pathways).
In addition to all this, it is important to recall that the coupling of endergonic and
exergonic processes always involves an exchange or transfer of energy, which in prac-
tical terms (i.e., in terms of mechanical and thermodynamic efﬁciency) demands some
sort of intermediary component.7 Furthermore, the maintenance of a whole network
of coupled processes requires establishing some way to distribute energy resources
(captured from the environment) across the entire system, so as to satisfy the energetic
needs of the processes occurring in it. This is impossible to achieve if each pair of pro-
cesses has its own intermediary component. Thus, a set of “common energy tokens”
or “currencies” turns out to be necessary to deal with this problem from the beginning,
from the very appearance of autonomous systems.
Living beings on Earth (i.e., cellular metabolisms as we know them at present) are
far too complex and evolved systems to be directly relevant for our analysis here, but
7 One might argue that the exchange of energy between two coupling processes (e.g., two chemical reactions) could, in principle,
be achieved through a direct transfer of heat. However, in practice this is not feasible because an efﬁcient (minimally reliable)
coupling mechanism cannot be articulated if such high levels of dissipation are involved.
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it is interesting to recall that all of them share some very basic features in this sense,
which apparently have been there from their actual origins. They use a common set
of energetic intermediaries, or energy currencies (as the remarkable work carried out
in bioenergetics during this century has shown [32, 41, 22]). It is particularly signiﬁcant
that at least two different types of energy currencies, one soluble in water (typically
ATP, but we could think of other precursor molecules, like pyrophosphate [4]) and one
linked to transport processes (a gradient of the electrochemical potential—of protons
or sodium ions), are necessary in all unicellular living beings, which continuously trans-
form the energy gathered from whatever external source into either of those convertible
currencies. The universality of this feature in our biological world is quite clear [71],
but we have to analyze to what extent this is necessarily so in the context of basic
autonomous systems of any kind. In order to do so, we need to consider ﬁrst another
fundamental problem related to it.
3.2 Building its Own Boundaries
The construction of the boundaries of a system, of a border deﬁning it as a distinguished
unit from the environment, stands out as one of the major challenges in reaching basic
autonomy. Some researchers in the ﬁeld of origins of life have speculated about the
possibility that proto-metabolisms could form in free solution (this would be the case
of de Duve’s [16] “thioester world,” for example) or on inorganic surfaces (e.g., the “bi-
dimensional proto-metabolisms” suggested by W¨ achtersh¨ auser [79]), presuming that
the compartimentation or self-encapsulation, of the system would take place after the
constitution of a relatively stable and robust component production network. These
authors offer a theoretical scheme in which the energetic-material viability of that kind
of network is, in principle, seriously taken into account, and that does not include the
endogenous production of a topologically closed interface (i.e., a global constraint that
establishes the spatial boundaries of the system).
We will not judge here the adequacy of these acellular models as representatives
of primitive, prebiotic chemical networks (in fact, we regard them only as interesting
proposals in that connection). However, we have to be critical in so far as they are
also presented as models of some sort of ancestral “metabolism” (i.e., models of fully
self-producing networks or of hypothetical prebiotic organisms). The generation of a
physical border is a crucial step toward autonomy, because that is the only way, on the
one hand, (i) to assure the control of energy ﬂow required for the robust maintenance
of the network, and on the other, (ii) to solve the problem of diffusion and dilution
(control of concentrations). Furthermore, if the precursor reaction network does not
become self-enclosed, it will not be able to create a particular—and minimally stable—
chemical micro-environment, being directly exposed to all changes taking place in
the milieu. In other words, the system will not have any control over the boundary
conditions that bring about its distinctive, far-from-equilibrium dynamics (and, thus, it
will be extremely fragile).8
So, in tune with several other authors (from Oparin himself [53] to—more recently—
Harold [22], Morowitz [49, 47, 48], Deamer [12, 13, 15], Bro [8], Pohorille & New [60],
or Cemin & Smolin [9]), we claim that membranes or cellular boundaries play a fun-
damental role in the constitution and maintenance of any (proto-)metabolic system. In
any case, it seems much easier to tackle the question of compartmentation while the
molecular complexity of the prebiotic system is still low (and the inside-outside distinc-
8 Neither a free chemical reaction network (` a la de Duve) nor a layer of active organic matter on a mineral surface (` al a
W¨ achtersh¨ auser) can overcome these problems. In the second case, precipitation on the mineral surface could temporarily
serve as a mechanism to get around the problem of diffusion, but it carries along with it some other difﬁculties, such as the high
dependence of the network on such a static external structure. W¨ achtersh¨ auser himself acknowledges [79] that the characteristic
holism of metabolic systems comes about with cellularity.
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tion involved is not so marked). Even though a global enclosure may be considered
initially as an additional source of difﬁculties in getting a chemical network running
(for instance, concerning the accessibility of certain compounds to the system), things
only get more complicated if its appearance is postponed. In fact, it is quite clear that
the more complex the network, the more complex the boundary required to hold it
together in a sustainable way. Thus, the development of (proto-)metabolic systems
towards higher and higher degrees of chemical and organizational complexity can be
more easily understood through the idea of a network-boundary complementary rela-
tionship, which allows for a continuous process of coevolution between the two.
3.3 The Osmotic Problem
Due to the gradual establishment of a different chemical environment within the sys-
tem (presumably more elaborate than the surrounding milieu), some mechanisms to
compensate and adjust for these changes and disparities are required. In particular,
any cellular system with a minimal internal complexity (or potential to grow in com-
plexity) has to face a serious problem related to the semipermeability of its boundary:
an eventual osmotic crisis. This seems to be an ab initio problem [58; see also 50] for
any real cellular proto-metabolic organization, and will determine the type of boundary
that this kind of system has to create.
By osmotic crisis we mean a critical situation of imbalance that results from con-
centration differences between the inside and the outside of the cellular compartment.
Such is the case of the so-called Donnan effect, where an excess in anionic charges
associated with the polymer chains built within a biological system is not adequately
compensated and, given the necessary semipermeability of the membrane, the sponta-
neous entrance of water into the compartment is unavoidable, leading to its bursting.
The fundamental mechanisms that (all) living beings use to face this problem are pumps,
which help to keep ionic concentration gradients below a threshold that would turn
out to be fatal for the system. One could imagine some other kind of mechanism to
hold the structure up, such as a cellular wall, which is quite common in the known
living world, too (though not ubiquitous).9 In fact, the cellular wall typically allows for
the plasmatic membrane to withstand a much higher osmotic pressure than that under
normal conditions. However, it seems rather unlikely that the cellular wall precedes the
invention of ion pumps, since (being a highly porous structure) it cannot contribute to
control the material ﬂow across the cell, which is of paramount importance for the ba-
sic organization of the system (and always relies on the semipermeability and transport
capacities of the membrane).
So, what kind of physical border is required for the constitution of a minimal au-
tonomous system? Just any boundary will not do. For example, a vesicle made exclu-
sively of structural amphiphilic10 compounds is not enough, even if these compounds
are endogenously generated. The physical border must, of course, be tightly linked
to the component production network (being at the same time a condition and a re-
sult of it, as the autopoietic school strongly emphasizes), preventing the diffusion of
the components, preserving spatial cohesion of the system, and providing a chemical
habitat of its own, where the system comes to exist. Nevertheless, it must also play an
active role, fundamental to establishing a new, autonomous way of interaction with the
environment and avoiding problems such as the osmotic crisis. This is precisely what
makes the self-construction and robust maintenance of the system possible.
9 Other possibilities, like the development of a cytoskeleton, seem too complicated at this preliminary stage.
10 Amphiphilesaremoleculesmadeoftwodistinctparts: apolargroup(typicallycalledthehead)attachedtoanonpolarchain(typically
called the tail). They are well known for their collective properties of self-assembly and the diverse types of supramolecular
aggregates (micelles, vesicles, etc.) that they form depending on experimental conditions.
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Therefore, rather than a boundary produced—and reproduced—by means of some
autocatalytic reaction happening within it (according to the autopoietic approach to
research on minimum autonomous systems), we should pursue a physico-chemical
interface capable of regulating interactions with the environment and controlling matter
and energy exchanges with it. Such an interface cannot be a mere physical border, but
must be a semipermeable chemical envelope where coupling mechanisms (in particular:
energy transduction and active transport mechanisms) are anchored. The membranes
of all known cellular living beings have this kind of mechanism, making clear that
their ongoing activity is fundamental for the constitution and maintenance of all natural
metabolisms.
A boundary with selective permeability (facilitating the transit of some substances,
like small organic compounds, and preventing the diffusion of others, like polymer
chains) and with channels of interaction with the environment must be an aggregate
of global and local constraints, since it involves a topologically closed surface (e.g.,
a micellar or vesicular self-assembly of amphiphilic molecules) where various other
components with more speciﬁc tasks are inserted: some devoted to carrying out catal-
ysis or mediated transport, and others to capturing energy from external sources and
transforming it into the system’s own means.
So, at this point, we can recapitulate and say that autonomy involves couplings be-
tween reactions and transport processes through the membrane. As a consequence,
there have to be, at least, two types of interconvertible energy currencies: a chemical
one and a chemiosmotic one (i.e., a gradient of electrochemical potential). This is the
only possibility for the system to gain control over the ﬂow of energy and solve all the
problems related to its material implementation as a cellular self-constructing organi-
zation. The use of component currencies and gradient currencies in a complementary
way precisely reﬂects the two dimensions of the problem of generating an encapsulated
network of component production processes. On the one hand, as has been pointed
out already, the capture of external energy and its conversion into chemically useful
compounds is critical for the system to keep a nonlinear, cyclic, far-from-equilibrium
transformation dynamics; on the other hand, it is also indispensable for establishing reg-
ulatory mechanisms of material ﬂow (such as channels, carriers, or ion pumps) to be
able to overcome obstacles related to the inherent cellular nature of the system (prob-
lem of accessibility, osmotic crisis, etc.), opening the way to develop a much higher
chemical complexity inside than outside its boundaries. This is such a fundamental
feature that all later forms of autonomy will need to keep it (as Harold [22] so rightly
points out: all cellular living beings are examples of “vectorial metabolisms,” based on
a very tight interweaving between chemical reactions and membrane processes, made
possible through bioenergetic mechanisms).
4 Basic Autonomy as Self-Construction: Universal Material Requirements
According to the issues discussed above, membrane, catalysts, and energy currencies
constitute the minimal set of components required to constitute and maintain the net-
work of endergonic-exergonic couplings underlying basic autonomy (see Figure 1).
Currencies prevent energetic dispersion and facilitate the coupling of chemical and
transport processes—one of the keys to implementing a real metabolic system. Cat-
alysts, in turn, are in charge of the temporal and spatial coordination of the set of
processes to be coupled, modifying activation energies, self-regulating their own ac-
tion, and making phenomena such as mediated and active transport11 possible. And
11 A mediated transport process is said to be active when, by itself, it is endergonic (that is to say, it can only occur in so far as it is
coupled with an exergonic process).
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Figure 1. Fundamental components of a self-constructing (basic autonomous) system. The endergonic-exergonic
couplings involve both internal processes and interactions with the environment. Hence the two types of arrow: (i)
todepictthefunctionalandorganizationalintegrationofinnerconstitutiveprocesses, and(ii)toshowthatthiscannot
happen without some control of the boundary conditions (i.e., active regulation of the ﬂow of matter and energy
through the system). The most obvious peculiarity of self-productive (autopoietic) systems is reﬂected in the nature
of the boundary, which includes here channeling mechanisms that are necessary to develop selective permeability and
agential behavior (capture of energy resources, control of concentration gradients by active transport, etc.).
last, but not least, the membrane provides a special chemical habitat for all these pro-
cesses to take place, including those involved in its own constitution (as a border that
separates and, at the same time, connects the outside and inside of the system). In
other words, the membrane leads to an asymmetry, a qualitative difference between
inside and outside, shaping the interactions between system and environment so as to
ensure autonomous management of the ﬂow of energy and matter through it.
These three ingredients are strongly interdependent. If one fails, all of them fail.
The relationship between the membrane and the catalysts is complementary, since the
former contributes to the production of the latter (because of the minimal concentration
thresholds required, and also because polymer synthesis could, indeed, be promoted
on the inner surface of the boundary) and, at the same time, without the latter the
properties of the membrane as an active border would vanish (especially as regards
the transport of compounds into and out of the system). The system of currencies
and the membrane are also mutually necessary. The membrane requires both chemical
and chemiosmotic currencies (for its construction and osmotic viability, respectively). In
turn, although it is not so difﬁcult to imagine chemical currencies in the absence of cells
(think of a scenario ` a la de Duve), what is important is the whole set, gradients included,
and this makes compartmentation necessary. Finally, without good entanglement and
coordination between catalysts and currencies, the role played by both of them as
facilitators of the couplings would not be possible (recall the role of ATP as a cofactor
of many enzymes, for example).
In sum, in order to establish a minimal autonomous organization, a deeply inter-
woven set of components (including local and global constraints) is required, together
with the production and interconversion of different types of work (at least, chemi-
cal and osmotic work). Chemical work is directly linked to the creation of molecular
bonds, where energy is stored and kept for subsequent transformations. Osmotic work
is related to the creation of concentration gradients (or, more precisely, electrochemical
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potential gradients) of several compounds for which the boundary of the system shows
selective permeability.12
The way in which a chemical system manages to create this initial tapestry of work
and constraints is not easy to determine. According to our account, the ingredients
of the triangle of basic autonomy must be jointly developed in the context of self-
organized cellular systems in far-from-equilibrium conditions, but the issue requires
further, experimentally supported research. Thus, in the next section we brieﬂy review
how the question of (basic) autonomy has been tackled up to now in the ﬁeld of ALife
and point out which would be the most promising avenues of research to yield more
satisfactory results.
5 Some Considerations for the Design of Artiﬁcial Basic Autonomous Systems
During the last decade, many efforts have been made to artiﬁcially reproduce a truly
autonomous system. In addition to a research program in computational simulations,
in the ﬁeld of realizations there are two main lines of research: autonomous robotics
and artiﬁcial synthesis of chemical or in vitro systems. As we are concerned in this
article with minimal forms of autonomy, in the following we will only discuss the
in vitro research, which is at present the most promising program in that respect. This
decision is also based on the fact that the in vitro research program is more coherent
with the approach to autonomy that we develop in this article (i.e., basic autonomy as
a chemical process, and the importance of thermodynamic requirements). Thus, we
will analyze next the efforts to artiﬁcially reproduce basic autonomous systems (BASs)
using chemical compounds as building blocks.
From a general perspective, the present situation is quite good for our purposes,
because within the scientiﬁc community there is growing interest in the problem of
creating artiﬁcial cellular systems in the lab [74, 59, 15, 34, 36]. The reasons for this
interest range from the enormous potential that cellular encapsulation has in the ﬁeld
of biotechnologies and pharmaceuticals, to the relevance of the minimal-living-cell
project for basic research on the origins and artiﬁcial synthesis of life (which is the
focus of this article).
In principle, there are two main ways to approach the design of minimal cellular
systems in vitro [34]: bottom-up and top-down. The bottom-up approach attempts
to create a self-organizing and self-maintaining cellular organization starting from the
known basic components (amphiphilic molecules, amino acids, etc.), whereas the top-
down approach attempts to decrease dramatically the complexity of an existing living
cell (without killing it) by eliminating all that is accessory in it. However, as a matter
of fact, most experimental work mixes these two approaches to some extent: typically,
the cellular envelopes are produced in a bottom-up way (relying on the self-assembling
properties of amphiphilic molecules), and the other molecular components included
in the system are already formed (or previously added as part of a kit). It is important
to be aware of this, especially in cases where the organic compounds involved (RNA,
DNA, enzymes) are so complex that they have to be borrowed from already existing
living cells.13
12 Of course, autonomous cellular systems show nowadays a much wider capacity to generate work (not only chemical and osmotic,
but also mechanical work), based on a sophisticated network of coupling mechanisms that reﬂects how the interaction with the
environment and the management of resources taken from it have developed throughout biological evolution. This ranges from
the coupling mechanisms required for the appearance of basic motility capacities (allowing phenomena like chemotaxis, more
reliable reproduction by division, intercellular associations, free movement, etc.) to those articulating rapid ways of cellular
communication necessary for cognitive processes.
13 We are quite critical of recently proposed models of “RNA or DNA minimal cells” (see, for instance [74] or [36]), in that
they take for granted the energetic requirements associated with the processes of synthesis of such macromolecules (which are
strongly endergonic). If one takes those requirements into account, it becomes obvious that such complex components and their
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In this context, we consider that the bottom-up strategy is the one to be pursued,
forgetting—at least temporarily—about the macromolecules that constitute present liv-
ing beings, and concentrating on the implementation of basic autonomous systems.
Along the same lines that Bro [8] defends, the real challenge for a wet ALife project is
to create chemical automata using components other than the ones found in biological
systems known to us. This could also give the key to part of the problem of the origin
of life on Earth, since the precursor molecules that made up basic autonomous systems
(proposed here as necessary prebiological systems) could be quite different from the
biomolecules that later came to integrate full-ﬂedged living beings.
Therefore, our starting point must be a physico-chemical domain where cellular ag-
gregates (micelles, vesicles, etc.) can form as a result of spontaneous self-assembly
processes. These, by themselves, are equilibrium structures that do not show any inter-
esting chemical-transformation dynamics. The ﬁrst step would be, then, to take these
systems away from thermodynamic equilibrium, trying to entangle the formation of cel-
lular aggregates with some chemical reaction that takes place within each compartment.
This was already achieved by Luisi and coworkers more than a decade ago [2, 3], and
those experiments were claimed to be the minimal chemical realizations of autopoietic
systems [35, 33]. In fact, as far as the theory of autopoiesis conceives the complementary
relationship between reaction network and physical/topological boundary, they could
very well be so (even if the chemical diversity of the network implemented seems too
low in comparison with the original autopoietic idea).
Nevertheless, as we argued in the previous sections, that view involves a rather
limited conception of the role of the boundary in the constitution of a basic autonomous
organization. Of course, it is very important to establish a mutually dependent relation
between a chemical reaction network and a compartment that encapsulates (and at the
same time is the result of) it, but doing so does not bring about minimal autonomy,
because the system has no control over the material and energetic ﬂow through it.
The cellular systems that appear in this scenario can change their shape, grow, even
reproduce autocatalytically, but do so without any control. Besides, since they have no
mechanism to modify or adjust critical boundary conditions (such as electrochemical
potential differences), they are very fragile with regard to possible changes in external
parameters (such as the pH).
According to our account on the origins of autonomy, the problem of transport
across the boundary of the system is crucial from the very beginning, from the actual
constitution of a cellular system with a minimal internal complexity and a changing en-
vironment. Among other researchers, Deamer is particularly sensitive to this problem,
and has tackled it from different angles, always concerned about the prebiotic rele-
vance of the organic molecules involved [54, 13, 14, 59, 15]. However, his empirical
work has been mainly focused on the analysis of the permeability and accessibility of
different types of compounds across plausible prebiotic membranes. Thus, the cellular
systems he and his colleagues have dealt with in the lab do not get close to our idea of
basic autonomy either, in particular because they lack energy transduction and active
transport mechanisms (and hence they would not be able to overcome, by their own
means, the problem of an eventual osmotic crisis).
The issue is quite tricky, for it involves the integration of several types of components
(at least the three that we suggested in the previous section) and the coupling of
chemical and transport processes. However, the bet is that it can be achieved with
relatively low molecular complexity: macromolecules are not needed for the task. Of
course, this is a working hypothesis that cannot be tested but through experiments. In
processes of synthesis have to be embedded in the self-constructing dynamics of the whole system, because they are actually viable
thanks to the network of endergonic-exergonic couplings that make it up and, ultimately, to the energy transducing mechanisms
established on its boundaries.
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principle, transport mechanisms (such as channels, carriers, and pumps) do not seem
to require long—or very sophisticated—polymer chains. However, if they are involved
in the coupling with a chemical reaction, this is not so clear. It brings us to the problem
of the origins of biocatalysis: that is to say, the problem of what could be the missing
link between inorganic and organic (enzymatic) catalysis. The catalytic capacity of
short polymer chains is certainly important (especially in view of their difﬁculty in
folding), but perhaps we should try to imagine a scenario where catalysis is not based
on stereospeciﬁc molecular properties, and can still be metabolically relevant.
In any case, what is certainly the key requirement from our perspective is that the
cellular system be treated as an integrated, functional organization in which energy and
material requirements are of fundamental importance. Therefore, a more encompassing
empirical approach is required, in the sense that it should try to connect chemical re-
actions with transport processes across the boundary of the system, articulating energy
transduction mechanisms. The artiﬁcial mimicking and simpliﬁcation of known bioen-
ergetic devices (see, for instance, [73] or [30]) is a good starting point for an avenue of
research that deserves much more attention.
6 Potential and Limitations of Basic Autonomous Systems
On these lines, BASs would be a key step not only in the origin of life on the Earth,
but on any other planet, or in any attempt to create artiﬁcial life in vitro. Before higher
levels of complexity (based on macromolecular mechanisms, e.g., genetic or enzymatic
mechanisms) are achieved, there has to be some self-constructing organization (like the
one we described in the previous sections) through which the material and energetic
problems associated to the actual capacity to generate that complexity are solved. In
other words, autonomous component production machinery is a requisite for life, or
even a prerequisite (depending on how one deﬁnes life). From our perspective (see
the next section) the phenomenon of life is deeply related to but qualitatively different
from basic autonomy, and in this analysis of the potential and limitations of BASs we
will start by giving an explanation for that conception.
BASs have a functionally integrated and homeostatic dynamics that, in principle, al-
lows for their propagation and the exploration of new ways to operate (both internally
and with regard to the environment). They can get reproduced, though not very reli-
ably (by autocatalytic growth and statistical division), and they will naturally diversify,
because they are open systems and their continuous production of components in a
changing environment has the potential to yield ever new molecular species. The new
components, processes, and coupling mechanisms that contribute to the constructive
self-maintenance of the system (i.e., that reinforce and expand the W-C cycle) will be
integrated and possibly kept within that dynamics. And so autonomous systems will
develop and turn into more robust self-maintaining organizations. Thus, from the very
beginning of autonomy, we can say that a potentially open scenario of systems with
self-modifying [24] and interactive capacities is established.
However, is this enough to guarantee the long-term sustainability of this kind of
systems in a changing environment with limited resources? And do BASs really make
possible a process of open-ended increase in complexity? These are very important
questions related to the evolutionary capacities of biological systems, and it is not clear
if systems with just a bare self-constructing organization could realize them.14 BASs
are adaptive agents (in the sense that they can—and need to—exert actions on their
14 These two questions are, in fact, tightly linked, because the long-term stability of a biological world crucially depends on how
living beings change in time and evolve through generations. Similarly, the long-term maintenance of autonomous systems will
not be guaranteed until they achieve high metabolic efﬁciency and robustness, reliable reproduction, and an open-ended capacity
to adapt and grow in complexity.
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immediate environment to ensure their own maintenance in the face of external pertur-
bations), so, apart from each individual’s homeostatic mechanisms, they can develop
interactive (competitive or cooperative) strategies to make more extensive and efﬁcient
use of the material-energetic resources available in their surroundings. And, given their
capacity to multiply and propagate, one could even speculate about the possibility that
a population of BASs might form some proto-ecosystem, establishing primitive food
webs, which would increase their chances of maintenance—as such a population—in
a materially limited environment.
Nevertheless, the ways in which BASs could change and evolve are very different
from the biological way of doing it. They lack mechanisms for reliable heredity, so,
strictly speaking, they cannot start a Darwinian evolutionary process. They are also
limited in that they have an upper bound of complexity (see below) that prevents them
from changing over time in a really open-ended way (in the sense of von Neumann
[51], later reinterpreted by authors like Pattee [56] or McMullin [37]).
Without special molecular mechanisms (which rely on the development of stereo-
speciﬁcity and, accordingly, on a quite signiﬁcant growth of polymer chains [72]), BASs
are able to reach only a very primitive level of efﬁciency, versatility, and reliability in
the catalytic and transport functions necessary for their continuous self-construction.
And, maybe more important for the issues we have just raised, this in itself constitutes
a limitation on the possibility for possible metabolic innovations to be effectively ﬁxed
(“recorded” in each individual organization) or to be later spread to other members of
the population.
Many of the molecular inventions and novelties arising in the hypothetical scenario of
BAS will turn out to be ephemeral, especially if they involve an increase in complexity.
This is due to the fact that, at this stage, growth in complexity means an important
energetic and material cost for the system (most polymerization processes are highly
endergonic), and the only way for such a system to maintain and extend its particular
organization and components is through a highly distributed autocatalytic dynamics.
That is to say, it needs to carry out recursively the whole network of processes in order
to achieve self-maintenance. And, as Segr´ e et al. [70] have pointed out, this is only
possible if complexity levels are not too high (or, as they more speciﬁcally state, if the
polymer chains are not too long).
Thus, for autonomous systems to be able to climb up in complexity, a new, safer
way to evolve has to be developed: a way that enables them to keep reliably—not
only through improving their global, distributed autocatalytic dynamics—those new
components and features that can be crucial for their long-term sustenance. In some
sense, we could say that BASs already have a certain capacity for “heredity” or some
“chemical memory,”15 but this is still very precarious: it is distributed over the whole
organization and not really trustworthy because it is subject to unpredictable, random
changes, as Rocha [62] rightly underlines.
All this leads to a ﬁrst major bottleneck in the evolution of autonomy: the functional
components of BASs need to grow in length to enhance their catalytic power and
efﬁciency (size matters for stereospeciﬁcity [72]) but, at the same time, if the system
generates higher levels of complexity (new molecular aggregates that can act as more
sophisticated constraints), its brittleness also increases, since there are no mechanisms
to store that complexity in the system (let alone to transmit it to other generations). In
other words, standard autocatalytic mechanisms are not reliable or precise enough to
ensure the continuous reconstruction and long-term maintenance of progressively more
elaborate molecular components (whose functionality will depend on the particular
15 This is what Segr´ e et al. [70] call “compositional information,” although the name is not very fortunate, because at this stage it is
far too early to start using the term information (see a bit further below, even if there will be no room in this article to discuss
the issue in depth).
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sequence of building blocks making each of them up) and the type of organizations
that those components would build up.
The solution to this problem comes with the appearance of molecular replication
and hereditary mechanisms, that is, when some functional components begin to show
template activity. In other words, the system has to start producing macromolecular
components capable of making copies of themselves (“hereditary replicators” in May-
nard Smith and Szathm´ ary’s [40] terminology). This involves a completely new form
of autocatalytic behavior in the system, which will bring about greater accuracy in its
reproduction (as a whole organization),16 and a high probability that its most relevant
functional components (together with the new dynamic organizational properties) will
be transmitted from one generation to the next. We conceive this stage as a one-polymer
world [5], like an RNA world, but deeply embedded (it could not be otherwise) in a
new type of metabolic organization: that of hereditary autonomous systems [65, 66].
There is, however, a second important bottleneck for autonomous systems in achiev-
ing open-ended evolutionary capacities and long-term sustainability. It is related to the
impossibility of making fully compatible (i.e., attaining by means of the same type of
macromolecular structure or polymer chain) two different sets of properties that come
to be crucial in this new scenario [42, 5, 65]: on the one hand, plasticity, speciﬁcity,
and efﬁciency in the performance of metabolic tasks (which requires the development
of substrate-speciﬁc catalysts), and on the other hand, reliable storage, replication, and
transmission of records, or information-carrying components (i.e., development of ge-
netic mechanisms, or what Maynard Smith and Szathm´ ary [40] regard as “unlimited
hereditary replicators”).
In order to overcome this problem, hereditary autonomous systems have no other
possibility but to start producing two types of macromolecular components that will
take up different but complementary functions in the organization of those systems.
The two types of components (informational records and highly speciﬁc catalysts or,
equivalently, genotype and phenotype) strongly depend on each other, and their (code-
mediated) complex interrelation changes profoundly the organization of autonomous
systems, at both the individual (metabolic) and the collective (ecological) level. In
fact, the solution to the bottleneck can only be articulated in the context of a more
global network, which involves many autonomous systems and many generations (i.e.,
synchronic, or ontogenic, relations, and diachronic, or phylogenic, ones). And the
new type of autonomous system that results from this transition, characterized by a
genetically instructed metabolism with efﬁcient capacity for open-ended evolution and
long-term sustainability, is to be called, properly, a living system.
7 Reviewing the Deﬁnition of Life
The statement concluding the last section clashes with the autopoietic conception of
life, in that a rather elaborate form of autonomy (not just basic autonomy) is regarded
in this article as minimal life, whereas autopoiesis is proposed as a necessary and
sufﬁcient condition for life [78]. This calls for a review of the problem of how to
deﬁne the phenomenon of life, which we will brieﬂy address here (focusing on three
critical points on the autopoietic deﬁnition), but have recently tackled elsewhere [65]
in a deeper and more encompassing way.
The main reasons why we claim that the autopoietic deﬁnition of life has to be
reconsidered and better accomplished can be shown by analyzing three interrelated
issues. The ﬁrst one is concerned with the level of abstraction that a deﬁnition of life
should have in order to be applied to living beings not only as we know them, but as
16 Note the different use of the terms “replication” and “reproduction” (following Dyson [17]).
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they could be (in Langton’s famous phrasing of the challenge [29]); that is to say, the
question of universality. The second has to do with the difﬁculty of discerning whether
life must be conceived, essentially, from the perspective of an individual organism or
as a collective phenomenon, that is, in the framework of a wider organization. And
the third one, although tightly linked to the previous two, refers more speciﬁcally to
the problem of whether basic autonomy is a sufﬁcient criterion to decide if a concrete
system is truly living. Special attention will be given to this last issue, since it is the
most directly related to the topic and contents of the present article.
7.1 Universality
It is quite common, especially in a ﬁeld like ALife, to argue that a deﬁnition of life that
makes any explicit reference to particular types of molecular components would be
“Earth-chauvinist.” Hence the claim that it should be articulated in rather abstract and
even formal terms. In this respect, the autopoietic deﬁnition of life is perfectly adequate.
However, it is excessively abstract, in that it offers a conception of the living that is too
detached from the physical—material and energetic—requirements that are crucial for
its actual implementation (as Fleischaker [20, 21] already highlighted, and we have also
remarked herein). This leads to a characterization of the minimal organizational logic
of biological systems in which physics and chemistry (thermodynamics in particular)
have nothing to say. Now, according to the arguments we have developed in previous
sections, any real and complete autopoietic system (or BAS, as we prefer to call it) must
be made of certain types of components: in particular, it must have a semipermeable
active boundary (i.e., a membrane), an energy transduction/conversion apparatus (a
set of energy currencies), and at least one type of functional component controlling
and facilitating self-construction processes (catalysts).17
These are general types of components (note that there is no reference to their
speciﬁc molecular composition) that come to the scene when a careful analysis of the
material-energetic requirements for the implementation of this kind of system (organi-
zation) is carried out. And they contribute to characterizing it in a more comprehensive
way, without losing universality. The fact that Varela and Maturana attempted to deﬁne
life in even more abstract terms could be interpreted as a consequence of how they
actually worked up the concept of autopoiesis (see Section 1). In any case, this excess
of abstraction is probably one of the reasons why they understated the organizational
changes linked to the appearance of macromolecular components (like nucleic acids
and proteins) in the course of prebiotic evolution, as we shall see below.
7.2 Perspective
Varela is right in stressing the individual aspect of the phenomenon of life, for only in-
dividual living beings are autonomous agents endowed with a self-produced and active
physical border, machinery for hereditary reproduction, and a degree of functional inte-
gration that is much higher than in any supraorganismic system or network. He claimed
(like Rosen [64] and others), that the process of biological evolution (and the unfolding
of all the hierarchical levels of organization in which the biological world is structured)
must be a consequence of the—necessarily previous—process of constitution and de-
velopment of systems that already show a characteristic individual organization: the
self-productive, or metabolic, organization.
However, can we speak of minimal life without including evolution? In order to
answer this question it is very important to realize that the individual organization of
any living being both reﬂects and depends on the existence of a historical-collective
17 To be coherent with what we said in last section, in order to have full-ﬂedged living systems another type of macromolecular
component should be included here (informational records), but that is not relevant to the argument at this point.
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organization, which, through genetic components, informs (instructs) each metabolism.
And this involves radical changes in the way metabolic processes are carried out by
the system. Genes play a fundamental role in the operational dynamics of each living
being because they are necessary for the synthesis of its proteins, its most valuable
functional components. In fact, all the genetic machinery serves to articulate the link
between the complex metabolic organization of living systems and the evolutionary
process out of which they come (and of which they are, at the same time, cause and
effect). Accordingly, the evolutionary capacity of life, on an individual scale, cannot be
regarded as a mere potentiality, but as a feature that is manifested in a particular way
of organization.
In other words, the insertion of autonomous, self-constructing systems in an open-
ended process of evolution has strong implications for their individual organization.
This is the reason why we make the distinction between bare and instructed meta-
bolisms. And this is why (as we have argued more extensively elsewhere [65]), a
deﬁnition of living beings (as individual entities) cannot be made without taking into
account their ecological and evolutionary side. It is precisely through the entanglement
between the individual-metabolic and the historical-collective dimensions of their be-
havior and organization that they ensure their robustness and long-term sustainability
as complex autonomous systems. Therefore, our disagreement with the Varelian au-
topoietic conception does not lie in the idea that autonomy must precede evolution
(in fact, we completely agree on that point), but in the conviction that the conditions
for the long-term maintenance of autonomous systems with an effective capacity to
grow in complexity have to be reﬂected in their organization, even at the most basic,
individual-metabolic level of analysis.
7.3 Autonomy
According to Varela and the autopoietic school, self-production (or self-construction,
as we prefer to call it here) is a sufﬁcient condition for life because it logically precedes
and includes the ability to reproduce, propagate, and generate diversity. Furthermore,
the overall conception is that living systems will not alter their most basic and charac-
teristic form of organization (the autopoietic organization), even if their components,
homeostatic mechanisms, ways to interact, and so on, change and get increasingly
more complex. From the autopoietic theorists’ perspective, nucleic acids, for instance,
could be admitted as necessary for Darwinian evolution; but that—they claim—would
not modify the essential logic of the living organization, its self-productive dynamics.
That is why the question of whether to include one or the other type of component
in the deﬁnition of life is not really relevant for these authors. They just take it as an
empirical challenge to determine what is the minimal degree of molecular complexity
required to realize an autopoietic organization.
However, although BASs are characterized by a self-constructing dynamics that
makes possible their development into living beings (otherwise they would not con-
stitute a crucial step in prebiotic evolution) and, in turn, living beings naturally retain
some of the features inherent in BASs (because they ultimately come from them), we
must be aware that there are very important differences in their organization and ef-
fective capacities (both metabolic and evolutionary, as we already mentioned in the
previous subsection). The transition from the origin of autonomy to the origin of life is
marked out by several serious bottlenecks (see Section 6), and the ways to overcome
those bottlenecks (e.g., the molecular mechanisms developed for the task) involve im-
portant, qualitative changes in the organization of autonomous systems, at both the
individual and the collective level.
More speciﬁcally, in order to start a process of open-ended evolution, autonomous
systems have to incorporate genetic machinery, where informational records are partly
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decoupled from all the muddle of metabolic reactions [44]. This decoupling turns out
to be fundamental from the organizational point of view, since it allows the recruitment
for and by the individual systems of the results of a much more encompassing process
of evolution (by natural selection), a process that takes place on a very different, much
longer time scale. The changes in the genetic components are largely independent of
(detached from) the dynamic, metabolic processes that those components instruct, and
that is why, in practice, the former appear as quasi-inert molecular structures. And
it is precisely when autonomous systems incorporate and integrate such quasi-inert
components in their metabolic organization that it becomes possible for them to grow
steadily in complexity and evolve in a truly open-ended way.
All this involves the establishment of a translation mechanism (a code) between the
informational and catalytic components of the system (DNA and proteins, in known
living systems), and a radically new form of organization, as Pattee [56, 57] has con-
sistently argued and we have also put forward in some other articles [42, 43, 44, 65].
Accordingly, there must be a qualitative jump between basic autonomy and life: only
living systems need to have a metabolic organization based on two types of comple-
mentary macromolecular components coupled through a code, because they have a
form of autonomy with capacity for Darwinian evolution and long-term sustainability.
Therefore, although the particular genetic code found in all living organisms on Earth
could be, to a certain extent, arbitrary (i.e., a frozen accident), the actual existence of a
code would be necessary both for the long-term persistence and for the open increase
in complexity of any population of autonomous systems; thus, it should be considered
as a universal feature of life.
One could still argue that autonomy and agency are enough to characterize life,
regardless of whether they are sustainable in the long run. And actually, if we ever ﬁnd
(in the lab, or on another planet) true BASs, it will be quite difﬁcult to refrain from calling
them living systems, given their repertoire of biologically relevant features. The trouble
is that this conception of life—apparently more universal—turns out to be inconsistent
with a precise enough characterization of the fundamental organization of real living
beings (which are, after all, genetically instructed metabolisms). In other words, we
would have to deal with two distinct theoretical constructs claiming to grasp the basic
organization of the living: one autopoietic and the other, so to speak, “autopoietic with
a code.” Actually, if BASs are ever found, they will develop—and belong to—their
own phenomenological domain; so if we decided to call that domain “biological” (not
merely “proto-biological”), we would then have to elaborate a new (more speciﬁc and
richer) deﬁnition for life as we know it on Earth.
8 Final Remarks
So far—probably due to the development and strong inﬂuence of molecular biology
in the last decades—enormous efforts have been and are being put into the abiotic
synthesis of the components of present living beings (of biomolecules, normally taken
as separate chemical species), disregarding the fact that they actually occur together
and their origins and nature may well be strongly interdependent. Nevertheless, at
present there seems to be an increasing tendency towards more systemic approaches
in biological research at large. It is of crucial importance, in our opinion, that this shift
also take place in the ﬁeld of the origins of life and contribute to refocusing its research
program.
The importance of the idea of autonomy, in particular of the BAS, lies in its great
potential to explain the origin of molecular complexity as a property of a whole sys-
tem, rather than a property of individual molecules. The identity of the system only
appears when a coherent set of couplings that link components, processes, and ﬂows
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of energy is established. Thus, the system is the result of a deep intertwining between
constructive and energetic relations, between the organizational structure and the spe-
ciﬁc materiality of its components, which explains the holistic character of the processes
that make it up. The emergence of an effective capacity for adaptive self-maintenance
(agency) is the consequence of this holistic organization. Furthermore, inherent in the
functional dynamics of BASs is their potential to produce and recruit ever new com-
ponents, which brings about a changeful scenario where novelty and variety naturally
emerge. In other words, the constructive and self-maintaining dynamics of these sys-
tems intrinsically pushes them to expand and explore new ways of operating, both
internal and externally.
So the appearance of BASs gives way to the creation of a world of functionalities,
as a consequence of their own machinery of continuous production and reproduction
of components, out of which those that contribute to the maintenance of the system as
a whole will be recruited. However, as we highlighted in Section 6, this capacity faces
a dilemma: the higher the complexity of the components, the more fragile the system
becomes. This apparent limitation can only be overcome with the invention of a new
kind of organization, based on the development of hereditary mechanisms which are
metabolically “off line.”
Nevertheless, the real value of BASs is in their creative nature as autonomous chem-
ical machines (or chemical automata), which allows us to think of a possible transition
between the inert and the living. In fact, only assuming the existence of BASs (or
very similar systems), a realistic scenario for the origins of genetic information can
be conceived, because they are the natural factory of all highly complex molecular
mechanisms (i.e., macromolecular ingredients and constraints). Furthermore, without
BASs it does not even make sense to conceive of informational systems, because (as
Wicken notably points out [81, p. 104]) genetic sequences require an open world of
functionalities in which these sequences are expressed.
Therefore, it is only in the context of metabolic agents like BASs that genetic ma-
chinery can be developed and—even more important—make sense. That is why both
the phenotype-genotype distinction and the consequent open-ended evolution process
are simply not viable without basic autonomy. In turn, genetic information plays an
outstanding role in the unfolding of autonomous systems because it makes their basic
self-constructive dynamics compatible with an evolutionary dynamics in which a steady
increase in complexity is possible.
There is no doubt that the challenge to synthesize life artiﬁcially is still very far from
our ability (will it ever be close?). However, the in vitro production of autonomous
chemical systems is certainly at hand, and it should be seriously tackled because, apart
from all the new knowledge and applications it would bring about, it would constitute
the ﬁrst major step in that huge challenge.
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